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viii 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of access 
roads on the process of spontaneous colonization of virgin forest land 
in the tropical lowlands of Bolivia . An access road in the Department of 
Santa Cruz serving an area opened up by spontaneous colonization was 
studied. The interpretation of aerial photographs and data collected 
in the area were used to illustrate the importa nce of access roads for 
successful spontaneous colonization . General conclusions were drawn 
with regard to the role that spontaneous colonizat i on as a dynamic 
force was playing in the development of Bolivia's tropical lowlands . 
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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Access Roads on Spontaneous Colonization 
Chane-Piray Area 
Department of Santa Cruz 
Bolivia 
by 
Thomas C. Royden, ~~ster of Science 
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viii 
The purpose of this study was to in·Jestigate the impact of access 
roads on the process of spontaneous colonization of virgin forest land 
in the tropical lowlands of Bolivia . An access road in the Department of 
Santa Cruz serving an area opened up by spontaneous colonization was 
studied. The interpretation of aerial photographs and data collected 
in the area were used to illustrate the importance of access roads for 
successful spontaneous colonization . General conclusions were drawn 
with regard to the role that spontaneous colonization as a dynamic 
force was playing in the development of Bolivia's tropical lowlands. 
(88 pages) 
INTRODUCTION 
Bolivia is the fifth largest country in South America. Its popula-
tion was estimated to be 4.7 million in 1970. Those classified as non-
urban constituted 65% of the total. 1 The overall population density was 
eleven persons per square mile , but this statistic is misleading because 
70% of the population lives on the Altiplano and in the high valleys. 
Large areas of the lm·.rlands in the Upper Amazon Basin are virtually 
uninhabited . Highland Bolivia is very poor. In 1969 the per capita 
income of the rural population was calculated at only $44 per anr.um. 2 
The highlands are characterized by a harsh climate, extensively eroded 
areas and generally depleated soils, In the more favored areas of the 
valleys there is considerable population pressure on the land. Farming 
units tend to be small, and crop yields are generally very low. 
Lowland Bolivia , isolated from the highlands by extremely difficult 
mountainous terrain, presents a complete con.trast. It is very sparsely 
populated with population density averaging less than t<;o persons per 
squar e mile. The climate is tropical, and much of the land is virgin 
jungle . The lowlands account for 70% of the total land area (Figure 1) , 
and is the least developed and most isolated region in the country. The 
agricultural potent i al of the area has not yet been assessed, but it is 
considered by Bolivian government officials to possess enormous unused 
natural r e sources and to be the last low- cost major unexploited land 
resource for food production on an international scale in South America . 
1 USAID Bolivia , Estadisticas Economicas, No . 13 (1971) , page 3. 
2Franklin Antezana Paz, "Ingreso anual per capita , " Presencia (La 
Paz, July 12, 1972 ) , page 3. 
E3 Valleys 
0 Tropical lowlands 
BOUVuA ESJ Altiplano 
CRAZIL 
Santa Cruz 
ARGENTIN A 
Figure l. Physiographic Regions and Political Departments 3 
3Tennesse Valley Authority , A Fertilizer Program for Bolivia (Ala-
bama, January, 1970), page 6. 
2 
3 
Role of Colonization in Bolivian Development Strategy 
Until 1952 the government policy on economic development emphasized 
the mining industry and industrial development in the highlands. After 
the 1952 revolution, the development of the eastern lowlands received 
top priority in the development strategy of the country. Since the low-
lands were so sparsely populated, agricultural colonization from the 
highlands was selected to play a key role in development of the region. 
Colonization was to have three main objectives: 
(1) Correct the unequal distribution of rural population with 
regard to land resources . 85%4 of Bolivia's rural population was crowded 
into the resource poor highlands, while the tropical lmvlands comprising 
70% of the national territory only had 15% of the rural population. 
(2) Diversify and increase agricultural production by promoting the 
cultivation of tropical. and subtropical crops, such as rl.ce and sugar; in 
order to reduce food imports, diversify exports and increase the national 
income. 
(3) Populate frontier zones and renote areas in order to promote 
their integration into the national life . 
The role of colonization as stated in the government 1 s ten year 
plan 1961-705 called for the resettlement of 100,000 families and the 
cultivation of 250,000 hectares of new land in the tropical lowlands. 
Between 1954 and 1966 the government selected three regions (Figure 
2) to begin the process of colonization: (1) Alto Beni with a connecting 
4rnstituto Nacional de Colonization, B.:1nco InterArnericano de Desar -
rollo , Programa de Colonizacion Informe Final (La Paz, Bolivia, 1970), 
page 1. 
5Republica de Bolivia, Junta Nacional de Planeamiento, Planeamiento 
(La Paz, Bolivia , 1961), page 164a . 
4 
highway to La Paz , (2) Chapare with a new road under construction to 
Cochabamba and (3) the region to the north of Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz , 
which had previously been isolated from the rest of the country, obtained 
a route for marketing its ag ricultural produce on completion of the paved 
road from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz in 1956 . 
Colonization Programs in Bolivia 
Directed co lonization 
The cold arid highlands presented a very different environment to 
the hot and humid jungles to which the highland Indians were supposed 
to move. Adaptation of the highland Indians to the tropics was considered 
an extremely difficult task. 6 Even the Inca empire , of which Bolivia 
was a part , never extended into the lowland tropical areas because of 
the difficulties of health, communications, etc . 
In recognition of this very different environment, the first pro-
grams of colonization were highly organized. The Cotoca project begun 
in 1954 in the Department of San t a Cruz under the auspices of the Corpor-
acion Boliviano de Fomento (C.B .f.) and the United Nations provided 
very comprehensive assistance. Land was cleared in advance for the 
settlers , and a monthly subsidy, housing , medical attention , credi t, 
technical assistance and community services were provided. This colon-
ization proved extremely expensive (US$3,350 per family) 7 and had very 
poor r esults . The poor results were due to the dependence of the 
6llome J. He nney , et al., Report of Santa Cruz Area Deve lopment 
Nission , U.S . Fo reign Operations Administration (1954) , page 21. 
7rnsti tuto Naciona l de Colonizacion Banco InterAmericano de 
Desarrollo , Programa de Colonizacion Infonne Final (La Paz , Bolivia, 
1970), page 2. 
5 
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8K. L. \Vess e l, An Economic Assessme nt of Pioneer Settlement in the 
Bolivian Lowlands , Cornell Universi t y (1968) , page 33 . 
colonizers on the sponsoring body and excessive paternalism on the part 
of the project administration. 
6 
Colonization with less comprehensive support was tried next . The 
colonist had to clear his land, build his house and plant his fields , 
but received land , foodstuffs for an initial period, technical help , 
seeds , medical care , credit and an infrastructure of roads. The sponsor-
ing agencies were the C.B.F. a nd the military. 
In 1965 the Bolivian government launched its most ambitious coloni-
zation program 1nth funds provided by the InterAmerican Development 
Bank. The plan called for 8,000 families to be settled on 300 , 000 
hectares of state lands in the areas of Alto Beni and Chapare , and the 
Yapacani Area of Santa Cruz. A loan (51- TF-BO) for US$6.5 million was to 
be used for infrastructure projects in the colonization ar eas as well 
as to cover the cost of moving the colonists. A complimentary loan 
(29-5F-BO) for US$2 . 6 million was to be used as "start up " production 
credit to be channeled through the agricultural cooperatives to be formed 
in the colonization areas. The objectives of the program as stated by 
the newly created Institute Nacional de Colonizacion (National Colonization 
Institute) were similar to those given by earlier planners . Howeve r , 
recognition lvas given to spontaneous colonization. The objectives were: 
(1) To serve as a pilot project for the transplan t ing of rural pop -
ulation from the densely populated highlands. 
(2) Increase and diversify the agricultural production of the 
country. 
(3) Serve as an incentive for the settlement of a large number of 
spontaneous colonists on land influenced by the government pr oject. 
The project is now completed and the final report to the InterAmer-
ican Development Bank shows that directed colonization by the Bolivian 
government has been an excessively costly method of sponsoring the settle-
ment of the "tropical frontier. " Of the 8,717 colonists sponsored by the 
project, 43% abandoned their land. 9 The main reasons given for the 
abandonment were illness, transportation difficulties, bad selection of 
land, and the desire to escape debts due to the project. The project 
appears to have suffered from the same evils as earlier directed projects : 
excessive paternalism, political maneuver i ng, discontinuity of effort, 
poor administration , and inadequate technical capability . 10 The average 
cost of resettling a family under the project was US$1 , 605. 11 If account 
is taken of the urgency of moving 100,000 families to the tropical low-
lands, it is seen that an investment approximating US$160 million is 
totally beyond the economic capacity of the country . 
Spont aneous Colonization 
One of the results of the various government projects to actively 
sponsor the movement of population to the tropical lowlands has been a 
parallel incr ease in population moving on their own initiative. Spon -
taneous colonization , which is movement of population without direct 
government help or stimulus , has developed in those areas where th e re 
existed free land of reasonab le productivity and some sort of high"ay or 
the anticipation of its construction . 
9rbid ., page 40. 
lOFrederick Zierten, Colonization in Bolivia (Hontero , 1971), page 6. 
llrb id . , page 32 . 
8 
In contrast to directed settlement where services s uch as roads, 
health, credit and extension were provided to attract settlers , span-
taneous co lonization only required the building of penetration roads to 
connect the frontier areas with the highway system . Once access roads 
connected the new land resources with major urban ma rkets and centers 
of population pressure, a flow of people and capital to exploit the 
economic opportunities resulted. 
As mentioned previously , the government directed projects have a 
dismal record with large scale abandonment by settlers and very slow 
growth in relation to the massive doses of public capital applied. In 
general , high levels of state involvement in the settlement process 
seem to have introduced rigidities leading to misallocation of resources . 
In contrast , spontaneous colonization, which is a direct response by 
individuals to t he economic opportunities offered by quality of natural 
resources, availability of markets and the viability of agricultu re, has 
shown great flexibility and growth. 
In the Department of Santa Cruz since the completion of the Chocha-
bamba-Santa Cruz highway in 1956 (F i gure 3) and its extension north to 
Montero and the potentially rich provinces of Ichilo, Santiesteban and 
Sara in 1967 , between 11,000 and 12 , 000 families 12 from the highlands 
have arrived as co lonizers. This colonization process has been to a 
large extent spontaneous (70- 80% of all immigrants). 
These settle rs now make up about 10% of the population of the whole 
Department and have made a very significant contribution to the economic 
12seminario de Ideas y Proyectos Especificos, Comite de Obras Publicas 
de Santa Cruz , Estrategia para Consolida las Colonias Campesinas del 
Interior en el Departmento Santa Cruz (1972) , page 1 . 
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development of the region. 14 It is difficult to imagine that the devel-
opment of Santa Cruz could have been as dynamic as it has been without 
the contribution of these colonizers opening up ne\v land and creating 
new settlements and roads; and providing agricultural labor for the 
expansion of major industries such as sugar cane and cotton. Although 
the Department has only 6% of the rural population of the country, it 
already contributes 30% by value of the gross agricultural production and 
produces 80% of the agricultural exports. 15 Even with this performance 
the potential of the Department has hardly been scratched . Of the 25 
million hectares of potentially arable land available in Bolivia, 40% is 
found in the Department, and as of 1972 only 180,000 hectares out of a 
total of 10 million hectares were under cultivation. 
Although the government had intended that its directed colonization 
project should serve as an incentive to spontaneous colonizers, it was 
caught unprepared and without funds, studies, technicians and "know- how" 
to face this massive movement of people to the new frontier. 
Disadvantages of spontaneous colonization 
Social and political problems 
The sustained and massive flow of rural population from the highlands 
to Santa Cruz may have been of considerable benefit to the country and 
in particular to the Department of Santa Cruz , but it has also created 
some significant social and political problems . 
14
or. Ing . P. Dante Invernizzi, Proyecto Capacitacion de Colones, 
Seminario de Ideas y Proyectos Especificos, Comite de Obras Publicas de 
Santa Cruz (May, 1972) , page 2. 
15Jose Romero Loza , Politica Agricola, Seminario de Ideas y Proyectos 
Especificos , Comite de Obras Publicas de Santa Cruz ( 19 72) , page 14 . 
11 
Since no government assitance for roads , medicine, water supply , 
etc., was initially available and the new colonists had very meager 
financial resources , their living conditions were deplorable . Their 
health was often badly affected by tuberculosis, internal parasites, 
tropical diseases and protein calorie deficiency. Not surprisingly, in-
fant mortality rates were over 300 per 1 ,000. 16 Due to isolation, lack 
of credit , ill-health, lack of experience with tropical agriculture and 
chaotic crop marketing conditions , the settler's economic progress has 
often been very slow . In resentment against the social sacrifice endur ed 
and the lack of government concern, extreme left -wing organizations such 
as UCAPO (Union de Campesinos Pobres) were formed and took such radical 
action as putting up road blocks, holding gove rnment officials captive 
and taking over the haciendas of large landowners (Chane Bedoya) . The 
colonization areas are regarded at present by government offic i als 17 as 
potential focuses for guerrilla activity because of the social deprivation 
experienced by the colonists . 
Destruction of resources 
The colonist , being limited to hand labor , uses slash and burn 
techniques to bring the jungle land into production . Rice is t he prin-
ciple crop grmvn because it has a guaranteed government support price 
and gives a quick cash return for the new colonist with its short growing 
season. Unfortunately , dryland rice is very sensitive to weed competitio n . 
This results in a costly cycle where yields decline and labor demands fo r 
16Hontero Community Health Proj ec t, Rural Health Services for Colonies , 
Northern Provinces of Santa Curz (Montero, Bolivia, 1971) , page 3 . 
l7~·Jiden Razuk Abrene, "Mensaje del Prefecto de Santa Cruz , 11 Presencia 
(La Paz , Bolivia , August 18 , 1972), page 10. 
12 
weed control rise after the second year. To keep farming the same land, 
the farmer must change to permanent crops such as sugar cane, bananas 
and pastu r e, or resort to chemicals and mechanized farming. None of 
these alternatives are open to the spontaneous colonizer because of lack 
of capital and credit ; so he moves on to clear another small area . By 
using hand methods , the individual farmer is never able to cultivate 
more than 2 to 4 hectares at one time . The results of this situation 
are the follO\<ing: 
(1) LO\< productivity. 
(2) Low income . 
(3) Low r ate of savings and reinves tment. 
(4) Abandonment of homesteads when all the high forest is cleared . 
(5) Instability in co~~unity formation and development . 
Acco-rding to studies by the Food and Ag-ricultural O-rganization of 
the United Nations (F . A.O.) experts , 100-120,000 hectares18 of valuable 
virgin forest are being destroyed each year in Bolivia . The dynamic 
energy of the settler s has already resulted in unrestricted encroachment 
into forest areas . There exists the great threat that these pioneer 
families trapped in a position of subsistence fa rming on a nomadic basis 
will cause degradation of wide areas of potentially very fertile land . 
This degrada t ion of the land by clearing th r ough cutting and burning and 
later abandonment causing the so- called 11 hollow frontier" has already 
reached frightening proportions in some areas of Santa Cruz . 
Present si tuati on 
Spontaneous colonizat ion has become so popular that many would-be 
settlers are pressing forward on their own initiative. The acceptance 
18"Destruccion de la Cobertura Forestal ," Pano r ama , Edicion 33 
(Santa Cruz , Bolivia , 1972) , page 2. 
13 
of this stream of immigrants requires the provision and opening up of 
additional reception areas. A clear decision by the government on the 
role that these spontaneous colonizers are to be expected t o play in the 
national economy must be made. Already considerable dislike and re sent-
ment against the highland colonizers has been generated in Santa Cruz 
among the local population. 19 However, for all the current problems if 
managed and directed with i magina tion the process of moving people to the 
r esource rich lowlands, that started as an expens i ve and not very success-
ful governmen t initiative, can become a self - susta i n ing spont aneous 
movement and potent force in Bolivia ' s development. 
19widen Razu k Abrene, "Nensaj e del Prefecto de Santa Cruz, " Presencia 
(August 18 , 1973), page 10. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Since spontaneous coloni zation impl ies only nominal pa rticipation 
of government in the settlement process, little i s known by governmen t 
about the conditions of the settlers . Poli tical demonstrations by the 
colonists f rom time to time drew attent ion to the ir pligh t, but little 
has been done t o help them. 
14 
In order that government may be able to manage and direct spontan-
eous co l onization fo r t he greates t benefit of all concerned, an under-
standing of the economics of this type of development should be obtained . 
The specific objectives of this study were to assess : 
(1 ) The viability of the agriculture practiced by spontaneous 
colonists in th e region of Santa Cruz. 
(2) The impact of spontaneous colonization on agricultural produc-
tion and employment generation in the area . 
(3) The economi c r e turn to public investmen t in infrastruct ure in 
support of spontaneous colonization . 
(4 ) The social and economic conditions of the colonists. 
(5) The long-run i mplica tions of present trends in the area . 
(6) The policy implica tions f or the government concerned with en-
couraging economic develo pment on the one hand and wise use of resources 
on the other. 
15 
SETTING OF THE STUDY 
Brief History of the Road 
The area selected for study was the Chane- Piray region north of 
Santa Cruz (Figure 4). Aerial photographs taken in 1964 show the area 
from Chane to Piray to be entirely covered by high forest except for one 
isolated ranch. In the same year the Gulf Oil Company pushed through an 
oil exploration track . A very smal l trickle of conlonists then began to 
occupy land along the track and cut down the forest. 
In 1966 wi.th the prospect of imminent completion of the paved road 
north from Hontero to Cuatro Ojitos , and thus a link to Santa Cruz and 
the national market, more colonists started to push north along the oil 
exploration track that had been partially kept open by loggers extracting 
the rich mahogany reserves of the area . In 1967 and 1968 the various 
colonies organized into sindicatos or farmer ' s unions for the purpose 
of getting title to their land. By 1969 the colonists '"ere sufficiently 
organized and had enough agricultural production for sale that it became 
an urgent necessity to improve their access road, tvhich ~vas impassable to 
motor traff ic most of the year and which caused them great hardship, 
isolation, and loss of sales . 
Each colony took responsibility for their particular stretch of the 
road . The sindlcatos in the area between San Pedro and Hardeman 
(Figure 4) collec ted $bl00 from each colonist (if the colonist did not pay, 
he was threatened with loss of his land) and with a total of $b47 ,000 
on their own initiative hired two D- 8 bulldozers from a road contractor 
Scale 1·2,500,000 
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Figure 4 . Relationship of Spontaneous Colonization Areas to Transport 
Facilities , Northe rn Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 1972 
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(Bartos Cia) to build up the road platform. All colonists in the area 
(540 turned up) had to give two weeks of free work. Their work was to 
chop down the forest in front of the bulldozers. Due to astute public 
relations and political pressure by the colonists on a sympathetic govern-
ment , the Servicio Nacional de Caminos ( National Road Service) provided 
a survey team to select the best alignment for the road , and finally a 
motor grader to smooth off the l·mrk of the bulldozers. The road work 
was finished in January, 1971. Maintenance of the road since then has 
been done on a community basis . However , the road has deteriorated badly 
through use by loaded trucks when wet and in many places can be described 
as little more than a canal in the wet season and a trench in the dry 
season . 
Reasons for Selection of the Road 
The road from Chane to Piray was chosen for the following reasons : 
(l) The soils of the area being opened up are some of the richest 
in Bolivia. 20 The fertility of the soils gives every chance for the 
establishment of a permanent agricultural system rather than a nomadic 
slash and burn system , if the inputs of technology and capital become 
available at the right time. 
(2) The area is representative of almost 1 ,000,000 hectares of top 
quality land on the east bank of the Rio Grande (Figure 4) which is still 
almost totally unoccupied and has been completely inaccessible by r oad . 
The area, however, is nO\Y being opened up by the government for settlement . 
20T . T . Cochran, A Land System Map of Central Tropical Bolivia, 
Minist r y of Agriculture, Bolivia-British Agricultural Mission (Santa Cruz , 
Bolivia, 1967), page 80. 
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Little more than access roads, wel ls for water supply and medicines are 
being promised by the government in this recently initiated low-cost, 
semi-directed project. 21 
(3) The area has been opened up entirely by spontaneous settlement. 
The only assistance given by government , und er mounting pressure from the 
established settlers , has been the drilling of artesian wells for water 
supply , assistance in improvement of the access road, and the supply of 
teachers and health workers for the schools and dispensaries built by 
self help. 
(4) The access road runs down the middle of a long tongue of good 
quality land that is surrounded by the swamps of the Rio Grande to the 
east and the swamps of the Rio Piray on the west (Figure 5). This isola-
tion provides a hinterland area with no interfe rence from other access 
roads. 
Also, since the tongue of land is never more than 15 kilometers and 
in most places only 10 kilometers across , most farms are very close to 
the access road. This means that a one dimensional rather than two 
dimensional model demonstrates the effec~ of deterio rating transportation 
facilities along the road. 
2lrnstituto Nacional de Colonizacion, Projecto de Colonizacion San 
Julian (La Paz, Bolivia, 1971) . 
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Bolivia , 197 2 
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DATA COLLECTION AND PROCEDURE 
Use of Aerial Photography 
Because no records were in existence except the aerial photographs 
taken in 1964, and a scattered settlement pattern made sampling on the 
ground difficult, it was decided to take aerial photographs of the area. 
The use of a e rial photographs fo r providing some of the initial data 
needed has many attractive feat ures. A large a rea can be photographed 
quickly and photographs will show details exactly as they appear on the 
ground . In locations such as the flat Santa Cruz lowlands where 
photographic scales are not appreciably altered by topographic changes, 
areas can be measured directly on contact prints with considerable 
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accuracy . 
Accordingly, the area was flown and photographed by the Bolivian 
Air Force on Monday, June 19 , 1972, at a scale of 1 : 30,000 . This scale 
was lat e r checked on the grou nd. This scale gives enoug h definition on 
the photographs for the hectareages of the more important crops and 
different vegetation types to be recognized and totaled . A mosaic of 
the photographs was prepared for the total length of the road. 
Calculation of Areas of Crops and Vegetation Types 
The device used for determining areas on the aerial photographs was 
a dot grid . A dot grid is a transparent overlay with dots systemat ically 
22u. S . De partment of Agriculture , Forest Service , "Forester's Guide 
to Aerial Photo Interpretation," Agriculture Handbook, No. 308 (Washington , 
1969). 
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arranged on a grid pattern. In use, the grid was aligned with a straight -
line feature (the road) to avoid position bias and then dots were tallied 
for each crop and vegetation type . Type areas were calculated by pro-
portions , i.e., the number of dots of a given type divided by the total 
number of dots counted yielded a percentage value that was multiplied by 
the total area to obtain the hectareage of each type. Initially nineteen 
separate areas were measured. For convenience in the final analysis, the 
various areas that showed conunon features \vere amalgamated into six 
sectors along the length of the road . The proportions of the various 
crops and vegetation types \vere then calculated for each sector . 
Use of Data from Aerial Photograph s 
The data from the aerial photographs were then combined with results 
from the field study made between April and July, 1972, in the project 
area and used to calculate the following: 
(1) Total land area under cultivation . 
(2) Gross regional agricultural production. 
(3) Total number of beneficiaries. 
(4) Increase in employment. 
(5) Total public investment. 
In order to clarify the economic factors operating along the Chane-
Piray road, complimentary socio-economic data were collected. In addition, 
four conununities on 1vhich economic data \.Jere available were selected to 
illustrate the change in economic conditions with deteriorating trans -
portation facilities along the road. 
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RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
Crops Grown in the Area 
The climate of Santa Cruz is suitable for a wide range of tropical 
and sub-tropical crops. Unfortunately , markets do not exist for most of 
the crops that could be grown by the colonists. The domestic market is 
small and can easily be saturated by minor increases in production. Due 
to the high cost of transport, exports of agricultural products (cotton 
excepted) are not competitive with alternative sources of supply in 
neighboring countries . The spontaneous colonizers, being at the 11 fron-
tier11 or extreme end of the road network and being served by a chaotic , 
inefficient and exploitive marketing system, find themselves at a distinct 
disadvantage when competing in the domestic market. 
Rice 
As part of the program for national self-sufficiency in food pro-
duction guaranteed prices have been given by the government for rice. 
Attracted by the stable price , spontaneous colonizers have become major 
producers of rice. The particular advantages of rice for the colonist 
a r e that it can be produced with hand labor (his major resource) , requires 
simple technology , gives a quick return, and has a guar anteed market. 
Sugar Cane 
Sugar cane, the second crop with a guaranteed price , also has the 
advantages of using large quantities of hand labor and simple technology . 
However, the crop cycle is much l onger (five years) and requires a much 
greater capital investment. Until 1970 , the quotas for delive r y of cane 
23 
to the sugar mil ls were controlled by the large cane growers (Federacion 
de Canieros) and considerable pressure was used to keep the small pro-
ducers out of the industry. Since 1970 and the drastic reduction in 
sugar production which necessitated imports from Brazil, the quota 
system has been abolished. 
The reduction in sugar production was in large part due to the large 
grmvers taking their land out of cane and putting it into more profitable 
cotton production. This abolishment of the cane quota system has allmved 
the longer established colonists with a better location near access 
roads to rapidly expand their cane plantings. Sugar cane profitability, 
however, is extremely sensitive to transport costs as will be shown later 
and becomes an alternative to rice production only in the best locations. 
Bananas 
Of t h e c rops that do not have a government support price, hananas 
are well adapted to peasant production if the physical growing conditions 
are suitable. In the area studied, rainfall and soil conditions provide 
high yields of good quality. The problem is marketing the crop. Bananas 
are extremely perishable, unlike the alternative crop, rice, that can be 
stored for months as rough or unhusked rice. When b ananas are mature 
they must be marketed immediately. Banana production is, therefore, 
sensitive to the reliability and regularity of transport services. 
Maize and other crops 
Maize is another crop that yields well and in the area studied can 
g ive two harvests per year. Unfortunately, the marketing situation is 
very chaotic Hith prices moving through wild swings. In two lveeks in 
Santa Cruz in 1971, the price dropped from $b30 to $bl7 per quintal. In 
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April, 1972, maize was selling for as low as $b8 per quintal in Montero, 
the main service town for the colonists. Along the access road colonists 
claimed that the ir harvest costs were $b6 per quintal and that t r ansport 
to Hontero cost $b4 per quintal. Hany of the farmers did not intend to 
plant maize again except for their home needs. The same story of glut 
or famine can be repeated for such crops as potatoes, yuca and citrus 
which are mainly g rmvn for home consumption because of the difficulties 
of marketing . 
Analysis of the Aerial Photographs and Changes in Land Use 
As can be expected from the above discussion, analysis of the aerial 
photographs shm.ved that only rice, cane and bananas were grown in com-
mercial quantities during the 1971-72 rainy season . Little evidence was 
found of the sizeable maize plantings reported for 1970-7123 in the area . 
For the purposes of analysis, the small areas of maize, potatoes, yuca , 
and citrus planted for horne consumption 1.vere i gnored . 
The percentages of scrub regrowth and high forest were included 
in the analysis because they showed firstly the intensity of land use, 
and secondly the dangers inherent in nomadic "slash and burn" cycles of 
rice growing where high fo rest had to be cont inually cut down to replace 
weed infested rice land. The ratio of the two percentages , in areas 
of rice monoculture , was an ind ication of how soon the colonists would 
run out of high fo rest and be forced to move on to look for new land to 
repeat their destructive cycle . 
23 Kenneth Graber , La Vida Agricola en las Colonias, Comite de Obra 
Rural, Distrito Or iental I glesia Evangelica Netodista en Bolivia (1972), 
page 15. 
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Changes in land use patterns 
From analysis of the aerial photographs, the road was divided into 
six representative sectors. As a cont rol or basis for comparison, a 
seventh analysis \vas made at Cuatro Oj itos three kilometers before the 
end of the paved road. This seventh analysis was included because the 
colony was founded at a much earlier date (1956). It was considered 
that land use patterns would be a function of both l ength of time of 
settlement and quality of transportation facilities . The particular 
area chosen at Cuatro Ojitos for analysis had the same level of fertility 
as l and along the access road studied. 
Land use patterns were found to change quite rapidly as transport 
distances increased and roads deteriorated, Table 1 , page 26 . 
Sugar cane 
As can be noted , commercial sugar cane production extends for 14 
kilometers do\vn the access road. The area is known to produce extremely 
high yields of sugar cane both because of its well distributed rainfall 
and its rich alluvial soils. Yields in excess of 70 tons of cane per 
hectare are spoken of as common place. In comparison, the average 
national yield for 1970-71 was only 24 tons per hectare. Many colonists 
further do·wn the road show great interest in g rowing cane now that the 
quota system has been abolished . However , when the transport costs 
involved are examined, Table 2 , page 27 , it is seen why the greater 
distance discourages sugar cane production . Transportation costs at the 
most distant grower sites could reach as much as 65% of the total value 
of the cane delivered to the mil l. 
Table l. Pe r centage of Each Sector in Different Uses , Chane- Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971-72 
Year Settled 
Distance from 
paved ro;J.d in 
kilometers 
Land Use (%) 
Sugar Cane 
Bananas 
Rice 
Scrub RegroiJth 
High Fores t 
Total 
Cuatro Oji tos 
1956 
35.2 
2 . 3 
1.0 
49 . 9 
~ 
100 . 0 
(l) 
Chane 
1965 
0- 6 
20.1 
8 . 7 
4 . 9 
40.5 
25.8 
100.0 
(2) 
Aguais 
1965 
6- 14 
9.2 
12. 5 
14.0 
26.2 
38.1 
100 . 0 
Sector (:3) 
Sagrado Corazon 
1966 
14-26 
2.6 
16.3 
60 .3 
20 . 8 
100 . 0 
(4) 
San Pedro 
1966 
26 -3 4 
0 . 7 
12.2 
50.9 
36.2 
100.0 
(5) 
Ca1ama 
1967 
34-65 
0 . 3 
7 . 5 
22.5 
__2'l:_]_ 
100. 0 
(6) 
El Carmen 
1970 
65-85 
1.3 
2.2 
...1.§..:2 
100.0 
N 
"' 
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Tabl e 2 . Cost of Transport in Sugar Cane Production, Chane-Piray Area, 
Bolivia, 1972 
Cost of 
Average Transport 
Distance Percent Transport as a % 
from of Value Costs to of Price 
Guabira Distance Sector in of Cane Sugar Received 
Sugar from Paved Sugar at Hill Hill by Grower 
Sector Hill Kmsa Road Kms Cane $b/Ton $b/Ton at Hill 
Chane 42 -48 0-6 20.1 90 35 38% 
Aguais 48-56 6-14 9.2 90 45 50% 
Sagrado 
59b Corazon 56-68 14-26 90 65% 
3 Kms or kilometers. 
bExtrapolated from cost for other sectors . 
Bananas 
Bananas are bought on the farm by i ndep endent truck owners either 
on their own account or for fruit merchants in Montero, Santa Cruz or 
Camiri. When the trucks can pass along the access road during a dry 
spell, the price paid for bananas is $b2 per stem. Distance from the 
paved road seems to make no difference in the price paid. Once the 
weather deteriorates and the road becomes a quagmire, trucke rs are 
extremely cautious about venturing dmvn the road in case they get stuck 
in deep "mud holes 11 and tvaste three or four days in digging themselves 
out. With fruit maturing and few truckers daring to venture down the road , 
the price of bananas drops rapidly. Colonists are happy to accept $b . SO 
per stem. Those farthest d01;n the road have the least chance of conlud-
ing a sale. 
Banana production is not as commercially attractive as sugar cane 
production, but is still a lot more attractive than growing rice (see 
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Table 4, page 30). It has the great advantage that the crop can be used 
to follow two years of rice instead of abandoning the rice land to weeds 
and scrub regrowth. This means that the expenditure of clearing high 
forest for producing rice for only two or three years is not wasted as in 
the "rice only " cycle where the land reverts to scrub. Since bananas can 
be considered a tree crop with more flexibility in timing of cultural 
operations, its cultivation allows good use to be made of family labor 
during slack times in the agricultural year. 
Banana production also provides a more permanent agricultural base 
\Vhich the colonist can use to step out of the cycle of nomadic rice culti -
vation discussed previously. It gives the colonist a chance to establish 
a more permanent agriculture and start to accumulate capital. Table 1, 
page 26 illustrated that as cane production becomes progressively more 
uneconomical because of high transportation costs, it is replaced by 
banana production. 
Banana production reaches a peak in the Aguais sector which is only 
6-14 kilometers f rom the end of the paved road. Production then drops 
rapidly because of the increased unreliability of transport to collect 
the mature fruit . 
Rice 
As has been discussed previously, ri ce production plays a ve r y impor-
tant part as the principle cash crop during the initial years of the 
spontaneous colonist while he is trying to establish himself . Apart from 
its advantages of a guaranteed market, short growing cycle, etc . , it can 
also be stored for considerable lengths of time after harvest as rough or 
unhusked rice without serious deterioration. This allows considerable 
time flexibility for the access road to dry out so that trucks can enter 
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and transport the rice for market ing. Also, r ice profitability is 
relat ively less sensitive to increases in tra ns port costs due to dist ance 
f rom the market at the rice mill (Table 3, belm,). Transportation costs 
Here found to vary from 6% to 12% cf the total value of t he rice at the 
mil l. 
Table 3 . Farm Gate Value of Rice and Transportaion Costs, Chane- Piray 
Area , Bolivia , 1972 
Value of Incidental Tr ansport Cost of 
Rough Rice Delivery Costs to Fa rm Gate Transportation 
at Hill Costs Santa Cruz Val ue per as % of Price 
pe r Fanegaa Fanegab per Fanega Fanega Received by 
Sector $b Sh $b $b Farmer at Nill 
Chane 161 9 11 141 6% 
Aguais 161 9 11 lid 6% 
Sagrado 
Corazon 161 9 12 140 7% 
San Pedro 161 9 14 138 8% 
Calama 161 9 16 136 9% 
El Carmen 161 9 20 132 12% 
3 0ne fanega is equivale nt to 384 pounds ri ce in hull . 
brncid ental del i ve r y costs per fanega : 
Four sacks at $b5 usable for t hree years $b7 
Unloading truck at $bl per fanega 1 
Drying rice in hull on drying floor 1 
Total $b9 
Certainly, compa r ed to sugar cane and banana produc tion , rice i s the 
obvious choice \Vhe re transport facilities are minimal . It is no coinci-
dence that it is "the" pioneer crop . As will be noted in Table 1, page 
2 6, rice grows in importance as one goes down the access r oad and transport 
facilities deter i orate . 
30 
Net return to land and management 
To ge t an understanding of the importance of location on the relative 
profitablity of various crops and the reasons for the rapid changes in 
land use patterns described previously, the r eturn to land and management 
has been calculated for each crop (Tabl es 30 to 32, pages 78 to 80) . These 
tables a r e summarized below in Table 4. The extremely large differences 
in return per hectare to land between the beginning and the end of the 
road can be viewed as an economic return or rent due to loca tion . This 
return to location would be expressed in rents or capitalized into sale 
value of land given a functioning land market in the area. 
Table 4 . Net Return to Land and Management for Various Crops, Chane-
Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971- 72 
Distance From 
Paved Road Sugar Cane Bananas Rice 
Sector Kilometers $b/Hectares $b/Hec tares $b/ Hectares 
Chane 0-6 1332 363 333 
Aguais 6-14 832 363 333 
Sagrado Corazon 14-26 132 230 323 
San Pedro 26 - 34 142 311 
Calama 34 - 65 142 283 
El Carmen 65-85 243 
Scrub r egrowth and high forest 
The significance of the percentages of scrub regrowth and high forest 
in the various sectors in Table 1 , page 26 , is that they give an indication 
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of how much of the original asset, the fertility of the high forest , is 
st ill available to the colonist . \-!here rice cultivation is practiced 
almost exclusively, such as in the sectors of Sagrado Corazon and San 
Pedro, the percentages give an indication of how far advanced is the 
cycle of 11 Slash and burn" cultivation . The sector of Sagrado Corazon is 
particularly noticeable in that 80% of the high forest has been destroyed 
and that 60% of the land area has already been abandoned to scrub regrowth, 
while closer to d1e paved road the sectors of Chane and Aguais only show 
percentages for land abandoned to scrub regrowth of 40% and 26% respec-
tively . The stabilizing effect of perennial crop production of sugar 
cane and bananas is very obvious . 
If consideration is given to the fact that rice production only 
reached sizeable proportions in 1968-69, it will be seen that it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that by 1974-75 all high forest will have been 
eliminated in the sectors of Sagrado Corazon and San Pedro . Once the high 
forest is eliminated, rice production in the 1.:..reed infested scrub regrmvth 
will become uneconomical and most colonists will be forced to abandon 
their land , homes an.d cormnunities and move on to look for new land ~.;ith 
unrestricted l1igh forest to devastate . A cycle that tl1e Bolivian govern-
ment cannot allm..r to expand and proliferate \.Jith all its attendant social 
instability , misery, and destruction of valuable forest resources . The 
alter natives available to the Bolivian Government to break the nomadic 
rice cycle are discussed in a later section. 
Economic Balance Attributed to Development 
of the Chane-Piray Area 
Farm gate value of regional agricultural 
production marketed 
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The farm gate value per hectare for each crop was calculated from 
production figures quoted as being average for the area both by colonists 
interviewed and by agricultural extension officials responsible for the 
area . Transport costs '"ere subtracted in the case of sugar cane (Table 
2, page 27) and rice (Table 3 , page 29) . The total area of each crop for 
each sector was found by multiplying the percentages for the sector 
(Table 1 , page 26) by the total area of the sector measured by planimeter 
(Table 5, page 33). The farm gate value per hectare for each crop was 
then multiplied by the different hectareages to give a value for the 
total number of hectares (Table 6, page 34). A global value for the farm 
gate value of the regional agricultural production marketed in 1971-72 
is $bl4 , 230,918. The assumption was made that the conservative yield 
figures used in Table 6 , page 34 , allowed for a small part of the crop to 
be used for home consumption. Most of the colo!lists are from the highlands 
\·Jhere maize and potatoes are the favored staple foods . Even though they 
grmv bananas and rice connnercially , these foods only make up a small 
part of their diet. 
Employment generation 
In 1960 the United Nations estimated that about 40 percent of the 
l abor force of South America "as either unemployed or underemployed.24 
24William C. Thiesenhusen , 11 Latin America ' s Employment Problem ," 
Science, Volume 171 (Harch 5, 1971), page 868. 
Table 5 . Percentage and Area of Each Sector in Different Uses, Chane- Piray Area , Bolivia 1971-72 
Sector 
(l) (2) (3) ~ (5) (6) 
Sagrado 
Chane Agu<>is Corazon San Pedro Calama El C.Jrmen Total 
Distance 
f rom 
Paved Road 0-6 Kmsa 6- 14 Kms 14 - 26 Kms 26-34 Kms 34-65 Kms 65-85 Krns 
- --- ----- --------------- ---- -------------- -- -------
Land Use % Hab ! Ha % Ha % Ha ! Ha % lla Ha 
Cane 20 .1 1,090 9.2 833 - ---- ----- -- --- ----- - ---- ------ ----- --- -- - 1 , 923 
Bananas 8 . 7 472 12.5 1 , 131 2 . 6 237 0 . 7 54 0 . 3 55 ------ 1,949 
Rice 4.9 266 14 . 0 1,267 16.3 1 , 485 12 . 2 947 7.5 1 , 367 1. 3 177 5 , 509 
RegroHth 40 . 5 2,198 26.2 2,371 60.3 5 , 494 50.9 3 , 954 22.4 4 , 083 2 . 2 297 18 , 397 
High Forest ~ l , 400 ~ 3 , 448 _1Q.Jl_ 1,895 ~ 2 ,812 ~ 12 , 704 ...2.U ]2,868 35,127 
Total 100.0 5 , 426 100.0 9 , 050 100 . 0 9 , 111 100 . 0 7,767 100.0 18 , 209 100 . 0 13 , 342 62 , 905 
aKms or kilometers . 
bHa or hectares. 
w 
w 
Table 6 . Farm Gate Value of Crops Harketed, Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia, 1971-72 
Distance 
from 
Paved 
Road 
(1) 
Chane 
0- 6 Kms3 
(2) 
Aguais 
6- 14 Kms 
Sector 
(3) 
Sagr ado Cora zon 
14- 26 Kms 
(4) 
San Pedro 
26-34 Kms 
(5) 
Calama 
34-65 Kms 
(6) 
El Carmen Total 
65-85 Kms 
- --------------------------------------- ----------------------
Land Use Hab Value Ha Value Ha Value Ha Value Ha Va l ue Ha Value 
Canec 1,090 2,997,500 833 1 , 874 ,250 ----- --------- - ---- --------- ----- --------- --- --- ----
Bananasd 472 416,304 1,131 997,542 237 209 , 034 54 47 , 628 55 48,510 --- ---- ---
Ricee 266 375,060 1 , 267 1 , 786,470 ~~ 2 , 079 , 000 --'?.!!]_ 1 , 306 ,860 1 ,3 67 1,859 , 120 !:l2 233 , 640 
Total 1 , 828 3 , 788 . 864 3 , 231 4,658,262 1 , 722 2,288,034 1 ,001 1 , 354 , 488 1,422 1,907,630 177 233,640 
aKms or kilometers . 
bHa or hectares . 
Ha Value 
1 , 923 4,871,750 
1, 949 1 , 719 , 018 
5,509 7,640 , 150 
9 , 318 14,230,918 
cY ield estimated at 50 tons / Ha valued at $b90 / ton delivered at Guabira sugar mill. 
dyield estimated at 24 , 000Kgrs/Ha valued at $bl per 60 lbs bunch giving a farm gate value of $b882 per hectar e. 
eYield estimated at 10 Vanegas of rough rice/Ha valued at $bl 61/Fanega of rough rice delivered at Sant Cruz ri ce mills. 
w 
... 
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The unofficial figure for Bolivia's unemployment and underemployment r ate 
was stated as being as high as 50% of the work force in 1972.25 Because 
of the restricted opportunities in the overpopulated and resour ce poor 
highlands, the rural population has been moving into the cities. The 
shanty tmms that are found on the outskirts of La Paz, Cochabamba and 
Santa Cruz are a symptom of this migration. \.Jhen these rural migrants 
arrive in the towns they have no training or skills to help them find 
employment. Even if these rural migrants could be trained, the local 
manufacturing industries would not be ab l e to expand sufficiently to 
absorb them . The rural poor arriving in the tm.rns constitute a highly 
volative and unstable element in the urban and national political scene . 
It could be argued that a considerable part of Bolivia ' s political insta-
bility can be blamed on the festering problem of the urban unemployed. 
Anything that the Bolivian government can do to keep these people on the 
land rather than flooding into the cities \vould reduce the social costs 
and malad justments related to premature migration. 
A positive value could be put on keeping the rural poor underemployed 
in the countryside rather than totally unemployed in an urban setting with 
the attendant high social costs. An alternative solution co uld be to 
encourage the rural poor to immigrate to the lm.;lands to put idle land 
and labor into productive use. Spontaneous colonization provides an 
extremely useful and low cost safety valve to the government for the pro-
blem of rural population growth and increased l a ck of opportunities that 
would otherwise force a flood of rural unemployed to the t01.rns to look fo r 
economic opportunity. The Bolivian gover nment ' s problem is to ensure 
25"Foreign Investors Show Hore Interest in Bolivia, 11 Times of the 
Americas (November 15 , 1972), page 6 . 
that spontaneous colonization offers sufficient economic opportunity 
through development of markets for agricultural production so that the 
colonization option is selected. 
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The contribution of development of the Chane-Piray Area to employment 
generation of 4.530 man/years of full-time employment in 1971-72 is given 
in Table 7, page 37. 
The increase in average size of holding for areas further down the 
road and settled later in time, noted in line 2 , Table 7, page 37, is due 
to the fact that the maximum land entitlement authorized by the agrarian 
reform la" was increased from the original 30 hectares to 50 hectares. 26 
This change was made because the "rice only 11 cycle requires much larger 
quantities of land. 
As will be noted in Table 7, page 37, no data was available for the 
El Carmen sector, because the land has only r ecently been allocated and 
colonists were just starting to move in. From the beginning of the access 
road to the sector of Calama , all land that is suitable fo r cultiviation 
(not subject to flooding) has been allocated. 
As ~vi 11 be noted from Table 7, page 37, the use of hired labor is 
surprisingly high . The ratio of hired labor to total labor used in 
production ranging from 1:2 for Chane and Aguais to 1:3.5 for Calama is 
a useful index of colonist involvement and integration into the wider 
economy. The high use of hired labor shows how strong the orientation 
of the colonist is to the money economy. Most of the labor is hired for 
either the two months of the rice harvest or the three months of the sugar 
cane harvest. Each colonist will have up to five laborers working for 
26Abraham Maldonado , Derecho Agrario (La Paz , Bolivia , 1956), page 
331. 
Table 7. Employment Generation, Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia, 1971-72 
Chane 
Total Areas of Sector Ha 5,426 
Average Size of Holding Haa 22b 
Number of Holdings 246 
Average Labor Use per Holding Family 
1. 4ld Labore Han/Years 
Average Labor Use per Holding Hired 
1. 46f Labore Man/Years 
Average Total Labor Use Man/Years 2.87 
Net Increase in Employment Man/Years 706 
Aguais 
9,050 
22b 
411 
1.4ld 
1. 46 f 
2 . 87 
1,179 
Sagrado 
Corazon 
9,111 
22 
414 
1. 31 
1.44 
2.88 
1,192 
San Pedro Calama El Carmen Totals 
7,767 18,209 13.342 62,905 
33 33 no data 
235 551 no data 1,857 
1 , 31 1. 24 no data 
0 . 84 0 . 48 no data 
2.14 1. 72 no data 
505 948 no data 4,530 
3 Kenneth L. Braber, La Vida Agricola en las Coloni as, Comite de Obra Rural-Distrito Oriental Iglesia Evangelica 
Metodista en Bolivia (Montero, 1972) , pages 44 and 45 . 
bExtrapolated from data for Sagrado Corazon. The Chane and Agua is sectors have many holdings of larger commer -
cial farmers. These holdings are, however, balanced by the large number of small holdings noted in the aerial 
photographs. 
crbid ., page 76 . 
dExtrapolated from data for Cuatro Ojitos . 
erbid .• page 76. 
fExtrapolated from data for Cuatro Ojitos. 
w 
'" 
38 
him during this period. The laborers are often recruited from the colon-
ist's home village in the highlands. This period of work as a contract 
harvester provides a very useful exposure for the future colonist to the 
problems and advantages of settling in the tropical lowlands. The strong 
demand for government to open up new areas for settlement is a demonstration 
of the success of this exposure. 
Economic Return to Public Investment in Infrastructure 
Public investment 
Although access roads may be the principle stimulus to settlement 
and development of new lands, services such as medical assistance , school-
ing , water supply , c r edit and extension are needed for the original 
settlement gains to be consolidated. These services should be provided 
in response to the demands of settlers as channels develop for fueir needs 
to be articulated . 
In this study only government expenditure on road wo r k , medica l 
assistance , schooling and water supply has been col l ected (Table 8, 
page 39). No account has been taken of agricultural extension work or 
credit extended since no credit was granted for rice production in 1971- 72 
as a matter of government policy because of r ice surpluses. Extension 
\Wrkers are only rarely able to reach the Chane- Piray area due to lack of 
money to pay for their travel and because of the pressure to serve commer-
cial farming interests located closer to Santa Cruz . 
Road construe t ion 
Due to greate r priority in other areas of the economy, the standards 
for farm to market roads in Bolivia are very low . In the tropical low-
lands roads, with the road platform built up from soil excavated f r om the 
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Table 8 . Public Investment: Annual Equivalent Costs, Chane-Piray Area, 
Bolivia , 1972 
Road Construction 
Survey for road alignment September 
1970 
Road construction personnel 
November - December 1970 
Total construction costs amortized 
for 20 years at 15% 
Total road construction 
\'ater Supply 
Hell drilling for drinking water 
11 ~;ells of 4 inch diameter 
September 1968 
4 ~;ells of 6 inch diameter 
August 1970 
Total drilling costs amortized for 
25 years at 15% 
Ministry of Health 
Maintenance of 2 dispensaries 
2 doctors@ $b32 ,500 per year 
4 nurses @ $bl0,200 per year 
Equipment and drugs 
Total a nnual costs 
Hinistry of Education 
t-laintenance of nine schools 
17 teachers @ $b7,800 per year 
Books and equipment 
Total annual costs 
TOTAL ANNUAL EQUIVALENT COSTS 
$b 10,146 
20,977 
39,658 
$b 70,781 
$b269 , 108 
134 250 
$b403,358 
$h hS,OOO 
40,800 
60,000 
$bl65 ,800 
$bl32 ,600 
20 , 000 
$bl52 ,600 
Annual 
Equivalent Costs 
$b 11,304 
62,399 
165,800 
152,600 
$b392 , 103 
site and tvith no additional materials such as gravel being used for 
surfacing, are considered adequate as long as they are closed to traffic 
after rain and preven tive maintenance is done regularly in the dry season . 
Total expenditure by the Servicio Nacional de Caminos on the Chane-
Piray road is detailed in Table 8, above. The Bolivian Transport Survey 
suggests dirt roads of the Chane-Piray t ype should be amortized over a 
twenty year period . The total annual equivalen t cost is $bll,304. 
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Potable wate r supply 
Although the area has a well distributed rainfall in excess of 1,300 
rnilimeters and a dry season that is not severe, the shortage of drinking 
water at times causes great hardship . The nature of the alluvial flood 
plain n1eans that no sources of good drinking water, such as springs, are 
available naturally. 
As soon as the dry season begins the shallow stvamps and water courses 
dry up. Easily contaminated shallow wells must be used or a long trek 
made to the rivers Piray or Grande. Luckily for the area , an artesian 
source of good quality water is found at a depth of about 120-160 meters. 
Obras Publicas, the public works organization of the Department of Santa 
Cruz has drilled 15 wells of 4 inches and 6 inches in di ameter in the 
area to supply most of the incipient population centers. Great satis-
faction has been expressed by the colonists with this supply. The 
effective life of the ''ells is taken as 25 years. The total annual 
equivalent cost is $b62,339. 
Health services 
As discussed in the section on spontaneous colonization, there is a 
conside rable health hazard in moving from the highlands to the tropl.cal 
l owlands . Without the support of health services, settler r esilience and 
enthusiasm would decline rapidly. In r ecognition of this, the central 
government provides staff for two dispensaries (pastas sanitarias) at 
Sagrado Corazon and San Ped r o. The government philosophy is that, if 
colonists will build the dispensary and provide housing for the staff , 
then the gover nment will pay the salaries of the staff and will also 
furnish some drugs. The facility at San Pedro is a primitive low- cost 
structure with palm leaf roof and walls . At Sagrado Corazon a brick 
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structure built with funds raised by Italian students working in con-
junction with the Silesian fathers f r om Huyurina (Montero) serves as a 
dispensary . The total annual cost of the health services is $bl65 , 800 . 
Education 
The government philosophy as regards the supply of educational ser -
vices is the same as for the health services, with the colonists being 
responsible for construction of schools and housing for teachers. There 
are a total of nine schools with seventeen teachers in the project area . 
The largest school at San Pedro has six teachers and five years of school-
ing are provided . The colonists show great interest in obtaining the 
best schooling possible for their children. The total annual cost of 
the educational services provided by the government is $bl52,600. 
Comparison of Costs and Benefits 
Normally, the cost benefit ratio or the internal rate of return is 
used as a measure of comparison between alternative p r ojects and to 
determine which project will give the greatest return to the capital 
resources used . In this study only the annual equivalent costs incurred 
by the government are compared with the g r oss and net benefits obtained 
in 1971- 72. This was done because it proved difficult to predict the 
shape of future cost and benefit st reams . Of particular difficulty in 
predicting the shape of future cost and benefit streams are unknowns 
such as : 
(l) The futu re rate of land abandonment by rice growers . 
( 2 ) The poss ibility that ranchers will buy at a cheap price the 
semi- cleared , but abandoned r ice land. 
(3) The possibility of the introduction of profitable new crops , 
such as sunflower and soya which may make a difference in the areas of 
rice monoculture as to whether the colonists abandon their land or 
practice crop rotation . 
Costs 
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A value has only been put on government resources committed to the 
area. Fiscal land was considered as free or having no value until it 
was made accessible by construction of the access road. The original 
investment by the Gulf Oil Company in making an exploration track that 
subsequently became the access road was considered to have no salvage 
value. Also, no value \vas placed on labor by colonists for work such as 
road maintenance, building of schools and dispensaries, etc. It \Vas 
considered that the labor had near z ero cost because the work was done 
during the slack time in the agricultural year. 
Gross benefits 
For calculation of gross benefits, no value was placed on labor used 
ir. production, since it was considered that in the highlands, where the 
colonists came from, the marginal value product or opportunity cost of 
their labor was zero. This position can be taken if the figure mentioned 
previously of a 50% unemployment and underemployment rate for the 
Bolivian work force in 1972 is accepted . No production was foregone in 
the highlands after the colonists moved except that used for their 
subsistence. The only direct benefit calculated \vas the value of the 
agricultural output based on farm gate value (Table 9, page 43) . No cal-
culation ivas made for the benefits obtained from reduced transportation 
costs from increased volume of agricultural products marketed. Indirect 
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Table 9. Gross Return to Government Investment, Cltane-Piray Area , Bolivla, 
1971-72 
Annual Equivalent Costs 
Farm Gate Gross Value of Regional Agricultural 
Production 
Annual Return Government Investment 
Amount 
$b 392 ,1 03 
$bl4,230,918 
3495 
benefits such as the multiplier effect on the r egio nal economy from 
development of the area and the creation of employment opportunities Hith 
the subsequent wealth generation \Vere not included. An annual gross 
return to government investment in 1971-72 of 3,L•95 was obtained. 
Net benefits 
For calculation of net benefits agricultural labor has been valued 
at the wage it commands in conunercial agriculture in the Department of 
Santa Cruz . Tables 27 to 29 give the production costs and Tables 30 to 32 
give t.he totaJ. return to land a nd management for the various crops in 
each sector. These returns to land and management totaled $b4,511,013 as 
shown in Table 10, page 44. Since this value is for 1972 only, it 
may underestimate r eturn for the project life, since only part of the area 
is developed. 
Net ben e fits with government paying 
all road construction costs 
The government ' s expenses for road construction have been very low, 
since advantage ~;as taken of the original investment of the Gulf Oil 
Company and work and money raised by the colonists. 
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Table 10. Net Re turn to Government Investment, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia, 
1971-72 
Amount 
Annual Equivalent Costs $b 392,103 
Net Benefits $b4 , 511, Ol3a 
$b9,77l,276b 
Annual Return to Govermnent Investment 1,0453 
2,380b 
3 \.Jith family labor paid at corrnnercial l;vage rates . 
brncludes net benefits of $b5 ,2 60,263 considered paid to family labor. 
Family labor would have been unemployed if it had not moved to Chane-Piray 
area. 
If the government is to contemplate opening up another area equival-
ent to the Chane-Piray Area, then the costs of road construction will be 
much higher. CosLs of $b60,000-$b72,000 per kilometer for local access 
roads in the lowland regions of moderate to heavy rainfall are suggested . 27 
Net benefits from the Chane-Piray Area with government paying the full 
construction costs of $b60 ,000 per kilometer for the 65 kilometers of the 
access road that are fully settled , plus all the other water supply, 
educational and health costs have been worked out in Table 11, page 45. 
Economic Factors Operating Along Access Road 
The advantages of location 
The principle stimulus for the initiation of spontaneous colonization 
is the construction of access roads. The quality of the transport 
27
stan f ord Resea r ch Institute , et al ., Final Report Bolivia Transport 
Survev, Highways, Volume 4 (La Paz, Bolivia, 1968), page 288. 
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Table 11. Net Return to Government Investment Including Road Construction 
Costs of $b60 ,000 per Kilometer for 65 Kilometers, Chane-Piray 
Area, Bolivia, 1971-72 
Amount 
Annual Equivalent Costs $bl,003,629 
Net Benefits $b4,5ll,Ol3 
Annual Return of Government Investment 348 
facilities available to move the initial production of the colonists 
plays a large part in determining the success or failure of the coloni-
zation venture. Proximity to a reliable highway provides great advantages. 
In the case of the Chane-Piray area, colonists located close to the 
paved road do not face the problems of colonists at the end of the access 
road, Hho must transport their products for long distances along a very 
poor road. The changes in crops grown (Table l, page 26) , the changes in 
net return to land and management (Table 4, page 30) and the changes in 
the index of net return to land and management per unit of cultivated land 
(Table 12, page 46) show how the location advantages operate . The index 
of net return in different sectors clear l y shows the great advantages 
enjoyed by those with better transport facilities. 
Intensity of land use 
Location advantages will direct l y influence the intensity of land 
use . Increasing transport costs and increasing isolation of the colonists 
as one goes down the access road will be r eflected in the decreasing 
relative value of production per unit of total land area served by the 
road. These changes are shown in Table 13, page 47. The very low value 
Table 12. The Index of Net Return to Land and Hanagement per Unit of Cultivated Land, Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia, 
1971-72 (Chane taken as 100%) 
Net Return 
to Land and Index of Net 
% of Total Nanagement Return to Land 
Cultivated % of Total Net Return Net Return to per Haa of and Nanagernen t 
Land Area of Cultivated to Land and Land and Cultivated per Unit of 
Secto r Sec tor Ha Land Area Hanagement $b Management Land $b Cultivated Land Area 
Chane 1 , 828 19.5 l, 711,461 37 . 9 936 100 . 0 
Aguais 3,231 34.5 1,525 , 520 33.8 412 50.4 
Sagrado Corazon 1 , 722 18.4 534, 165 11.9 310 33.3 
San Pedro 1,001 10 . 6 302, 185 6.7 301 32.5 
Calama J , 422 15.1 394,671 8.7 277 29.6 
El Carmen 
___rJ}_ ____.!_:_2_ ~Oll 1.0 243 27 . 0 
Total 9 , 381 100.0 4 , 5ll,Ol3 100 . 0 
3 Ha or hectares . 
..,. 
"' 
Table 13 . The I ndex of Agg r egate Produc tion per Unit of Total Land Ar ea , Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia , 1971- 72 
(Chane taken as 100%) 
Gr oss Value of Index of 
% of Gross Agricultu r al Agricultural 
Gr oss Value of Value of Pro duction per Production per 
Land Area of % of Total Agricul tural Ag ric ul tur al Hec t a r e of Total Unit of Total 
Sector Sector Hectares Land Area Production $b Production Land Ar ea of Sector Land Ar ea 
Chane 5 , 426 8.6 3 , 788 , 864 26 . 6 698 100 . 0 
Aguais 9,050 14.4 4,658 , 262 32.7 514 73. 4 
Sagrado Cora zon 7 ,lll 14 .5 2, 288 , 034 16 . 1 321 35.9 
San Pedro 7,767 12.4 1,354, 48 8 9.5 17 4 24.8 
Calama 18 ,209 28 . 9 1,907 , 630 13.4 104 15 . 0 
E1 Carmen 13. 34 2 21.2 ____231 , 6 4 0 1.7 17 2.6 
Total 62 , 905 100.0 14 , 230 , 918 100 . 0 
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for the ind ex as one approaches the end of the road raises the question 
as to whether the level of production justifies expenditur e on road 
improvement. A lot of the land in sectors such as San Pedro and Calama 
has already been cropped to rice and then abandoned. 
\./hen these changes are computed per kilometer of road (Table 14, 
page 49) , then a basis can be established as to when i ncreased production 
warrants upgrading of the road . Whe r e new ag r icultural areas are being 
divided into holdings of 25 to 50 hectares for intensive farming by 
colonists , the recommendation28 is that local access roads should be 
provided at a rate of one kilometer to each 100 to 200 hectares of cul-
tivated land. As can be seen, the first 14 kilometers of the access 
road have a much higher intensity of land use with the sectors of Chane 
and Aguais already having 305 hectares and 404 hectares , respectively , of 
cultivated land per kilometer of road and production valued at $b631 , 477 
and $b582,282 per kilometer . 
The Soc ial and Economic Conditions of the Co l onists 
It 1wuld appear out~;ardly that most underemployed and land - hungry 
peasants from the highlands would benefit by leaving their villages to 
take a land grant in the resource rich t ropical lmvlands . This study , 
however, has stressed tha t t hose colonists sett l ing t he 11 frontier " suffer 
considerable isolation and hardship. \-Tho these pioneer families are 
that have chosen to abandon their t r anditional ~;ay of l ife, and ho~; they 
have fared in their colonization venture is of consider able importance 
to the evaluation of spontaneous colonization . Four communit i es on which 
28
stanford Research Institute , et al., Final Report Bolivia Transport 
Survey, Highways , Volume 4 (La Paz, Bolivia , 1968) , page 288. 
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Table 14. Hectares Cultivated and Value of Production per Kilometer of 
Road, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971-72 
Distance from Hectares Value of 
Paved Road Cultivated Production per 
Sector Kilometers per Kilometer Kilometer $b 
Chane 0-6 305 631,477 
Aguais 6-14 404 582,282 
Sagrado Corazon 14-26 143 190,699 
San Pedro 26-34 125 169,311 
Calama 34-65 46 61,536 
El Carmen 65-85 9 11,682 
Average 110 115,775 
d.<lt~ M is available for 1970-71 from the study by Kenneth Graber, _!:.a Vidd 
Agricola en las Colonias 29 , are discussed. The data has been divided 
into social and economic factors. 
The four communities are: 
(1) Cua tro Oj itos Hhich is sited on the paved road and was founded 
in 1956. 
(2) Sagrado Corazon which is 35 kilometers from the paved road and 
was founded in 1966. 
(3) San Pedro Hhich is 45 kilometers from the paved road and was 
founded in 1966 . 
(4) Calama which is 60 kilometers from the paved road and was 
founded in 1967. 
29Kenneth Graber , La Vida ~cola en las Colonias , Comite de Obra 
Rural, Distrito Oriental Iglesia Evangelica Metodista (Montero , Bolivia , 
1972). 
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The data is based on a 10% sample of the colonists in each colony.30 
Social factors 
Educational level 
The rate of illiteracy for Bolivia was estimated in 1961 at 70% for 
the country and at about 80% in the rural areas. 31 The colon i sts , if 
they were the disadvantaged or landless sector of the rural population 
of the highlands before moving, would be expected to have the highest 
rate of illiteracy. This idea turns out to be very far from the truth. 
The colonists are, in fact , a well-educated group (Table 15, page 51). 
The most isolated colony, that of Calama, which draws its members from 
the Potosi Area is particularly interesting, having 41% of the heads of 
households \Vith 4 to 6 years of fonnal education. Rural Potosi is one 
of the most isolated and back1.vard departments, so there has been a very 
selective response to the expected rewards and difficulties of moving to 
the lov1lands. 
It is easy to conjecture that this mobile and well-educated group 
\vould have migrated to the towns to add to the urban unemployed if 
coloni.za tion opportunities had not been available. 
Percentage that colortized on 
their mm ini tiative 
Mention was made earlier that in the directed colonization program 
funded by the InterAmerican Development Bank, that 43% of the colonists 
30Kenneth Graber, La Vida Agricola en las Colonias, Comite de Obra 
Rural,Distrito Orienta l Iglesia Evangelica Metodista (Hontero, Bolivia, 
1972), page 5. 
3lsranford Research Institute, et al., Final Report Bolivia Transport 
Survey, Economics, Part B, Volume 2 (La Paz, Bolivia, 1968), pages 4-29 
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Table 15. Years of Formal Education for Heads of Households, Chane-Piray 
Area, Bolivia, 19713 
Years of 
Formal Cua tro Sagrado 
Education Oj i tos Corazon San Pedro Cal a rna 
0 26% 47% 44% 22% 
1-3 44% 36% 28% 37% 
4-6 27% 17% 20% 41% 
7-9 2% 8% 
3 Kenneth Graber, La Vida Agricola en las Colonias, Comite de Obra Rural , 
Distrito Oriental Iglesia Evangelica Metodista (Montero, Bolivia, 1972), 
pages 39-40 . 
sponsored by the proj ect abandoned their land. Nany returned to their 
original villages, but others looked for better land in areas such as 
that served by the Chane-Piray road. Table 16, page 52 shows the 
percentages of colonists t hat came entirely of their own initiative and 
at their own expense. The colonies founded at an earlier date show 
more colonists moved at government expense . This is an indication that 
the colonists originally moved at gov e rnment expense to a government 
project and t hen responded to the great er economic opportunities seen in 
settling the Chane-Piray Area . 
Family data 
The ave r age household of a colonist can be described as that typical 
of a young married fami ly (Table 17 , page 52). The fathe r is 33 years of 
age, has 2 to 3 children and has 1 r elative , usually either a parent or 
unmarried brother, living in his house. This corresponds well \·lith 
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Table 16. Percentage Who Colonized on their mvn Initiative, Chane-Piray 
Area , Bolivia, 19713 
Cua tro Sagrado 
Ojitos Corazon San Pedro Calama 
Percentage that Colonized on 
their own Initiative 
aGraber, page 51. 
85.7 86.6 100 
Table 17. Family Data, Chane - Piray Area , Bolivia, l97la 
Cuatro Sagrado 
Family Data Ojitos Corazon San Pedro 
Average Age of Head of House-
hold in Years 35.7 32.5 31.9 
Average Number of Children 
in Household 3.3 2.0 2.1 
Average Number of Persons in 
Household 5.9 5.2 5.4 
3 Graber, page 33. 
90.6 
Calama 
34 .l 
2.9 
5.6 
assumptions on 'vhich age group would be most attracted to the economic 
opportunities available in the tropical lowlands. 
The close relatives who help with the agricultural work will often 
use the family home as a springboard for their own colonization efforts . 
Health 
Moving from the healthy arid highlands to the humid tropics can be 
traumatic in itself. When this move to a ne"v environment with completely 
new health hazards is made ~.Jith no government health services to support 
the colonists , it can be easily understood if failures are many. One of 
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the greatest fear of the colonist is to fall ill during a crucial period 
in the crop cycle and thus lose his crop. The number of days lost due to 
sickness in Table 18, below, gives a good idea of how great this risk is. 
An average of a month of work lost in every year is a heavy toll to pay. 
Many of the illnesses \vill leave the colonists severely debilitated. 
Table 18 . Average Number of Days of Work Lost Due to Sickness per Year, 
Chane- Piray Area, Bolivia, 197la 
Cuatro Sagrado 
Ojitos Corazon San Pedro Calama 
Average Number of Days Lost 
per Year 
aGraber, page 34-35 . 
Permanence of settlement 
36 28 21 31 
For those at the end of the access road feeling the worst of the 
transportation difficulties and caught up in the unending toil of the 
slash and burn cycle of rice monoculture, the temptation to abandon the 
struggle to make a living on the "frontier 11 must be very real. Those with 
better transportation facilities will be less likely to be thinking of 
moving as is shown in Table 19, page 54. The fact that 15% of the popu-
lation of Calama intervie\ved are thinking of moving within a year shows 
how marginal they consider their existence at the end of the road and 
what little hope they have for an improvement in their circumstances. 
The 6.7% of the population of Sagrado Corazon who are thinking of moving 
are probably those who are running out of high forest . 
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Table 19. Permanence of Settlement, Chane-Piray Area , Bolivia, 19713 
Cuatro 
Ojitos 
Sagrado 
Corazon San Pedro Ca1arna 
Date when Colony was Founded 1956 1966 1966 1967 
Average Number of Years Lived 
in Colony 7.8 3.9 3.9 3.2 
Percentage \-lho are Thinking of 
Hoving within l Year l.3 6.7 0 15 . 6 
aGraber, page 30. 
Economic factors 
For the colonist to survive during the period of initial settlement , 
he Hill have to grmv at least one crop ~vhich can prov i de him with a quick 
cash return. This crop is usually rice. For the colonist to expand his 
farming operation and increase his standard of living he will have to 
diversify his production with more capital int ensive enterprises such as 
sugar cane or livestock production. This expansion will require greater 
use of yield increasing technology~ greater access to organized markets 
and increased availab i lity of capital and credit. In examining the 
various economic factors affecting the colonists' success in converting 
from a subsistence level of living to the status of a commercial farmer, 
the effects of deteriorating transport facilities will be particularly 
prominent. 
Availability of production credit 
One of the greatest bottlenecks to expanded production experienced 
by the colonists has been the lack of financial resources to hire extra 
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labor during busy times in the agricultural ye ar , such as planting and 
harvest. In recognition of this the government made available limited 
amounts of production credit to rice growers. This credit \Vas last made 
available in 1970-71. In 1971 -72 because of embarrassing national sur-
pluses of rice, no more credit \vas made available. Hmvever, non-govern-
ment sources of credit provided by produce middlemen or rescatadores 
continued. Loans are made by these produce middlemen on the guarantee of 
the standing crop to colonists who do not have adequate funds to complete 
the crop cycle. Interest rates of 8 to 10% per month are charged with 
adequate security. The interest rate charged by the official Agricultural 
Bank has a legal maximum of 12% per annum. A loan from the Agricultural 
Bank is, therefore, preferable if it is obtainable. In 1970-71 the most 
isolated colonies received the least credit and a considerable portion of 
that \Vas made up of expensive credit supplied by the rescatadores (Table 
20, page 56) . It could be argued that institutional credit would be too 
"risky" i n an unstable frontier area, such as Calama , where many colonists 
a r e contemplating moving out of the a r ea . Rescatadores with their closer 
personal connections with the colonists and high interest rates can 
better tolerate this risk. 
Use cf labor in agricultural 
production 
The colonists, when they arrive to claim tl1eir plot of jungle land, 
bring with them little else except their enthusiasm and physical strength. 
From this labor of cutting down the forest and planting crops, must 
be created all the resou rc es to keep their families alive. Their lives 
for the first few years are little more than a struggle to keep alive 
and slowly expand their foothold in the jungle. Only slowly does their 
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Table 20 . Availability and Source of Credit , Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia , 
1970-71 a 
Cuatro Sagrado 
Ojitos Corazon San Pedro Calama 
Percent that Received Credit 42 27 12 10 
Percent that Received Funds 
Direct from Agricu ltural Bank 58 25 67 34 
Percent that Received Agricultural 
Bank Funds Directed through 
Cooperatives 27 50 33 33 
Percent that Received Funds 
from Rescatadores 33 
Percent that Used other Sources 
Friends , Neighbors , etc. 15 25 
8 Graber, pages 61 -63 . 
way of life pass from that of subsistence living to full participation 
in commercial agriculture. In the early years ~vhile establishing them-
selves, colonists will often hire themselves out as laborers to work for 
their richer neighbors or for the large commercial farms nea r er Santa 
Cruz . 
As their economic circumstances improve , they will in turn hire 
labor to expand thei r production . As Table 21, page 57 , shows, the 
widespread us e of hired labor is a n indicat ion of the involvement and 
integration of the colonists into the wider economy . As expected , the 
more isolated colonies use less hired labor. One interesting point is 
the numbe r of co l onists who hired themselves out for wage labor . Little 
of the traditional highland c ustom of mutual help without payment of 
wages within a community seems to have survived the conlonists ' entry 
into commercial agriculture. 
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Table 21. Use of Labor in Agricultural Production, Chane-Piray Area, 
Bolivia, 1970-?la 
Cuatro Sagrado 
Ojitos Corazon San Pedro Calama 
Percent \fho Worked for other 
Persons for a Wage 11.70 85.00 48.00 50.00 
Percent Who Hired Labor 67 . 50 73 . 30 64.00 53.00 
Family Labor used on the Farm 
Han/Years 1.41 1.44 1. 31 1. 24 
Hired Labor used on the Farm 
Han/Years 1.46 1.44 0 . 84 0 . 48 
Total Labor used on the Farm 
Man/Years 2.87 2.88 2.15 1.72 
8 Graber, pages 51, 54, and 76. 
Technical assistance 
Access to yield increasing technology is vital if the colonists are 
to expand their agricultural production by increased productivity of their 
labor and so improve their standard of living. The colonists in the area 
are not well served by the extension division of the Hinistry of Agricul-
ture because l arge commercial farmers closer to Santa Cruz obtai.n 
priority in assistance . The cooperatives in the area, as well as the 
produce middlemen , however, have a vested interest in giving technical 
assistance to protect the colonists ' crops from insects and diseases, in 
order to protect their loans. The various sources of technical assistance 
used by the colonists are given in Table 22, page 58 . The experimental 
station in Saavedra, which services the Department of Santa Cruz , is on 
the main highway to Santa Cruz. The surprisingly high use of the extension 
Table 22. Sources of Technical Assistance, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia, 
1970-71 a 
Cuatro Sagrado 
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Percent Who Used Ojitos Corazon San Pedro Calama 
Extension Division Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Experimental Station 
Cooperative 
Commercial Agency/Produce 
Middleman 
Neighbor 
3 Graber, pages 49~ 50. 
18 
3 
13 
53 
8 25 
12 9 
13 20 19 
12 6 
63 24 22 
division of the Ministry of Agriculture by the colony of Calama could be 
due to the high educational level of the colonists . 
Marketing of crops 
In most situations \vhere there is an underdeveloped marketing and 
processing system, a group of middlemen traders will usually take advan-
tage of the primary producers. The Chane-Piray Area is no exception. 
The increased distance from the main road, greater difficulties in 
arranging for trucks to carry pr oduce to market and increased time away 
from the farm to market crops all encourage the more isolated colonists 
to sell their produce through middlemen. Table 23, page 59, shows how 
ttte more isolated colonists, because of greater marketing difficulties , 
are often forced to sell their p r oduce on the farm and thereby receive 
lower prices. The ve r y high percentage of colonists (63%) at Calama who 
sell their crops Hithin the colony shows hmv great their marketing 
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Table 23. Crop Harketing Patterns Along Access Road, Chane-Piray Area, 
Bolivia, 1970-7la 
Cuatro Sagrado 
Ojitos Corazon San Pedro Calama 
Percent Hho Sell Crops vri thin 
their colony 17 17 38 63 
Percent Hho Received Rice Support 
Price of $bl50/Fanega 72 . 7 50 10 19 
Average Price Received for 
Rice $b/Fanega 139 136 127 114 
3 Graber, pages 55-58. 
difficulties are and how they must be resigned to accept a price well 
belmv the government support price of $bl50 per fanega. Because of the 
bad condition of the access road, the colonists at Cal a rna will be the 
last group that the truck mvners '"ill want to contact for sale or trans-
port of their rice. 
Production and income data 
~oductio~. All the various trends in access to markets, 
availability of credit, etc., discussed previously should be reflected 
in very considerable advantages to those enjoying a better location and 
better transport facilities. These advantages are reflected in the 
production and gross income data shown in Table 24, page 60 . With regards 
to average gross income from annual crops, the expected trend is demon-
strated by all colonies except Cuatro Ojitos . It is suggested that the 
unexpected low aver age gross income for annual crops in Cuatro Ojitos 
(a much older colony) is due to scrub regrowth being clear ed for crop 
production . Yields will be depressed by weed infestation and declining 
Table 24. Crop P r oduction and Gross Income Data, Chane-Piray Area, 
Bolivia , 1970-7la 
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Cuatro 
Ojitos 
Sagrado 
Cora zan San Pedro Cal am a 
Average Number of Hectares in 
Annual Crops, Hectares 5.3 6.6 6 . 7 4 . 8 
Average Gross Income from 
Annual Crops $b/Year 3,253 7,658 6,804 5 , 173 
Average Numbe r of Hectares in 
Permanent Crops , Hectares 10.2 1.8 2.0 1.7 
Average Gross Income from 
Permanent Crops $b/Year 26,217 295 180 157 
Percent \Vith Income from 
Permanent Crops 70.1 16.7 8.0 12.5 
8 Graber, pages 66 , 67. 
fe rtilit y. Hith regard to average gross income from permanent crops , 
the expec ted trends are d~nonstra ted very strongly. Only Cuatro Ojitos 
has a suitable location to exploit commercially permanent crop production 
of sugar cane and bananas. The hectares of p e rmanent crops reported for 
the other areas are plantations of bananas, citrus and yuca, mainly us ed 
for home consumption with very limited sales being effected because of 
high transport cos ts. 
Livestock production . In an area of s urplus maize and rice produc-
tion , it is s urprising that excess productio n i s not converted into 
marketable l ivestock products, such as pork, l ard, mil k , beef, etc ., for 
which there is a strong internal and external demand . Unfortunately , this 
type of production requir es considerable investment by the go verrunent in 
supporting veterinary services to safeguard the health of the animals in 
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the area. This support has been almost totally lacking with livestock 
being regularly devastated by ferocious epidemics which a r e common to 
this humid tropical environment. 
Because of the initial high investment required to start livestock 
production with cattle (to establish a hectare of pasture with fencing 
requires a minimum investment of $1,500 per hectare) and the risks of 
losing ones ' animals f r om uncontrolled epidemics in pig product i on , 
colonists are not prepared to risk their hard won capital in livestock 
production (Table 25 , below). The very low gross income reported shm<s 
that most livestock products are used for home consumption . As expected , 
more people have horses or mules for transportation as the road deterior -
ates . 
Table 25. Livestock Production and Gross Income, Chane-Piray Area , 
Bolivia, 1970- 7la 
Cuatro Sagrado 
Ojitos Corazon San Pedro Calama 
Percent Who Have Cattle 11.7 3.3 0.0 3 . 2 
Percent 1-/ho Have Pigs 9 . 1 6.7 4.0 9 . 4 
Percent 1-/ho Have Sheep or Goats 12.4 6 . 7 4 . 0 o.o 
Pe r cent l-ll1o Have Horses o r Mu les 0 . 0 6 . 7 4 . 0 9.4 
Average Gross from Livestock 
$b/Year 203 . 0 0.0 110 . 0 137 . 0 
aGraber , pages 68 , 69. 
Net income 
Al l the economic t rends mentioned previously 1vork to the disadvantage 
of most recently arr ived settler s who mus t occupy the most isolated land. 
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The trends are reflected in net income data (Table 26 , below). Cuatro 
Ojitos, the colony ~vith the best location, shows an average per capita 
net income of $b2,140. If this figure is compared with the aver age per 
capita net income of $US44 . 00 or $b528 quoted previously for the rural 
population of Bolivia in 1969 , it can be seen that the colonists have 
improved their standard of living very considerably by moving. For those 
near the end of the access road at Calama with a net income per capita of 
only $b841, the advantages of moving are less obvious if one takes i nto 
consideration all the hardships and health hazards involved in the move 
to the tropical lowlands . The low average net income per capita for 
Calama easily explains the instability of settlement mentioned previously 
for this colony. 
Table 26 . Net Income Data, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia, 1970-lla 
Cuatro Sagrado 
Oj itos Corazon San Pedro Calama 
Average Income per Farm $b 12,625 9,433 5,476 4,709 
Average Income per Adult Horker 
$b 4,399 3' 275 2 , 547 2' 7 38 
Average Income per Capita $b 2,140 1,747 ·1 '053 841 
3 Graber , page 75. 
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LONG RUN IMPLICATIONS OF PRESENT TRENDS 
The basic thesis of this study is that knowledge of the economic 
opportunities available, very limited operating capital and a firm market 
for a few products have been combined by spontaneous colonizers to put 
virgin land and idle labor to use in expanding Bolivia 's agricultural 
production . How far continued expansion is self-sustaining without 
furth~r government inputs for such activities as technological innovation, 
introduction of new crops and rationalization of marketing wi ll now be 
examined . 
The first thing to mention is that the highland colonists are not 
low performers because of lack of aspirations, but rather from lack of 
opportunity. The destructive cycle of rice monoculture has been adopted 
by the more isolated colonists because of lack of opportunity to adopt 
any other type of agricultural production . The lack of economically 
viable alternative crops has left the colonists t r apped in their nomadic 
" slash and burn" cycle . The long-run implications of the growth of this 
cycle and its expansion from the addition of new colonists , in forest 
destruction, soil deterioration, instability in community formation, and 
was te of human energy are serious. As the government prepares to cope 
with the expected increased flow of colonists from the highlands , plans 
should be made so that future colonists will be able to establish pros-
perous and stable farming communities. 
Up to the present , the dimensions of the problem of the "hollow 
frontier" of abandoned land and unstable communities as the colonists 
move on to look fo r new land with high forest, has been masked by the 
64 
rapid expa nsion of comme rcial agricultur e into the abandoned land. The 
Santa Cru z Area has been enjoying a cotton boom for the last few yea rs . 
Cotton g rowing is a full mechanized and highly technologi cal activity 
that is a lmost entirely confined to highly capitalized large commercial 
farme r s or corporations . The clearing of high forest to begin the growing 
of cotto n is ext remely expensive at an average cost in 1972 of $b2,300 
per hectare for 10 hours of work with a D8 bulldozer. If a commercial 
farme r can buy up the semi-abandoned land of a colonist which is mainly 
scrub regrowth , he can save himself considerable land clearing costs. 
The cos t of clearing scrub regrowth averages out at $b 500-l,OOO per 
hectare and only requires 2 to 4 hour s of work with a DS Bulldozer . The 
current sale price fo r scrub regrowth land r anges an~<her e from $b200-700 
pe r hecta re depending on location. The margin in clearing costs acquired 
by the commercia l farmer plays an important part in local capital accumu-
lation. 
It can be observed that the settling and clearing of state l and and 
sa l e of the partially improved property is starting to emerge as a way of 
life fo r sorr1e colonists who will have migrated successfully to ne w 
front i e r areas twice in the last 10 years. Sadly, the colonist ' s role 
has frequently been that of contributing towards the development of some-
one else ' s production unit, while making no progre~s towards his own 
economic and socia l improvement . The colonist finds that 1vhile th e 
conunercia l farmer expands his production, his mvn pioneering efforts earn 
little more t han su rvival in pove r ty and ignorance. Hmv much longer the 
cotton boom continues and conunercial farmers continue to reoccupy the 
abandoned l and of the "hollow frontier" is a matter for debate. Also , 
fo r debate is the question whether the capital i ntensive and labor 
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extensive cattle ranching enterprises will expand into areas with aban-
doned land where the climate is too wet for cotton such as the Chane- Piray 
Area. 
The Consequences from no Increase in Commitment of Government 
Resources to Spontaneous Colonization 
The obvious choice for the government when deciding tvhere to best 
employ scarce resources will be to stimulate growth at the point where 
immediate response will be greatest. The greatest returns will be seen 
to be obtained by expanding the opportunities of commercial farmers. 
Already a dualistic pattern is emerging around Santa Cruz where food 
production with primitive technology is being left to the colonists, 
while commercial agriculture concentrates with government support on 
export and industrial crops . This, unfortunately, has the result of 
encouraging the consolidation and excessive concentration of large land 
holdings in the more accessible and better lands with the exclusion of 
the small farmers to the isolated "frontiers.'' Some of the colonists 
with better location are managing to reach fo r a better level of living, 
but the rest of them are being sque-ezed into tighter and tighter corners 
by the more productive and advantaged commercial farmers. If the colon-
ists remain trapped in their nomadic agriculture, and the level of living 
of the mass of colonists as compared to the large farmers draws too \Vide 
apart, then disruptive social upheavals as experienced by Bolivia during 
the Agrarian Reform of 1952 ~;ill again threaten. The invasion of large 
properties, such as Chane-Bedoya, by colonists in 1970-71 , has already 
signaled the threat of social conflict. 
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The Expected Results from Increased Commitment 
of Government Resources 
If both welfare of the colonists and economic g r mvth are emphasized, 
there are many attractive alternatives . The Andean group (Pacta Andino), 
of which Bolivia is a member, represents an inunense potential market for 
agricultural products from the Santa Cruz Area. The countries of the 
group were deficient in wheat, milk products, vegetable oils, maize, 
meat, rice, and timber to the value of $US400 million in 1972. 32 All of 
these products could be supplied by the Santa Cruz Area . 
With the provision by government and private enterprise of a system 
of silos, price stabilization and exporting organizations to overcome 
market limitations, the colonists could rapidly expand their production 
\Vithout undue subsidy. Provided \Vith profitable and stable markets for 
their products, the colonists could give up their nomadic rice monocul-
ture , practice crop rotation and introduce work animals, such as mules 
or oxen . The introduction of work animals would expand the cultivated 
land area of a colonist to 10-20 hectares from the 2-4 hectares cultivated 
at present by hand methods . The use of work animals YJOuld increase the 
productivity of labor by increasing the land area cultivated per colonist 
and low·ering costs . In the colonization areas , it is the very low 
productivity of labor that partially accounts fo r the low standard of 
living. 
To the colonists , the crops that are particularly attractive are 
maize and oil seeds , such as soya and sunflower. The crops are attractive 
because of the simple technology needed and the high yields obtained. 
3211Espectativas en Hercados Internacionales, 11 Panorama, Edicion 33 
(Santa Cruz , Bolivia, 1972), page 5. 
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The oil seed crop and industry whic h has been neglected up to the present 
by the gove rnment would not only supply vegetable oil as an import sub-
stitute, but also soya bean meal for poultry and swine production. With 
a local volume oriented pork processing and marketing industry developed 
\Vith soya bean meal , a market for maize would evolve. A firm market for 
maize and soya beans would r emove the development ce i ling that has 
hovered over the colonists . Processing the feed g r ains in situ through 
livestock would provide a pr oduct less vulnerable to Bolivia ' s high 
transport costs which has usually stopped domestic production being 
competitive in internat i onal ma rkets. 
68 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOHMENDATIONS 
Bolivian agriculture is composed of two sectors, the over-populated 
highlands and the resource rich, but under-populated lowlands. During the 
last 20 years the Bolivian government has devoted considerable resources 
to the development of the tropical lowlands. Since the lmvlands are 
sparsely populated, agricultural colonization from the highlands was 
selected to play a key role in development of the region. 
The various government colonization programs to sponsor the movement 
of population to the lowlands have not been particularly successful. 
They have proved to be extremely expensive and suffered from lack of 
adequate planning and coordination be t~veen government agencies. 
Hhile government r esources were being devoted to development of the 
tropical lowlands and planned colonization of selected areas, various 
voluntary and uncontrolled migration patterns \vere developing. These 
movements of population developed in response to new economic opportunities 
offered by availability of free land and government investment in roads 
and other infrastructure in the lowlands. This study is concerned with 
settlement of virgin for est land in the Department of Santa Cruz by 
people from the highlands without direct government help or stimulus. 
This type of settlement is called spontaneous colonization. 
The general objective of this study was to clarify the factors in-
volved in the initiation, subsequent rate of expansion and role that 
spontaneous colonization could be expected to play in the development of 
Bolivia ' s tropical lowlands. Special attention was paid to the impact 
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o f access roads on spontaneous colonization. To make the study, an access 
road serving an area opened up during the period 1966-72 by spontaneous 
colonization Has selected. Aerial photography of the immediate area of 
the road, together "ith relevant data collected in the field between April 
and July of 1972, "as used to evaluate the impact of the access road on 
spontaneous colonization. All government expenditures on road construe-
tion, potable water supply, education and medical services was compared 
with the value of agricultural production from the area for the agricultural 
year 1971-72. 
Conclusions 
-------
(1) The limited government investment in infrastructure for the 
spontaneous colonization area studied was economically justified , if 
analysis permits using gross regional product as a measure of benefits. 
(2) The investment had a major employment impact and met minimum 
acceptable income standards . 
(3) The spontaneous colonization area examined show·ed that a 
permanent and viable agriculture had been established i~ areas of better 
location at: low public investment cost. 
(4) The public investment cost for infrastructure in support of 
spontaneous colonization was $US21 per family as compared to a cost of 
$US1 , 605 per family reported for the last majo r government colonization 
project. 
(5) As a process fo r settlement of the tropical frontier, spontan-
eous coloniza t ion showed great flexibility for responding to economic 
opportun i t i es. High levels of state involvement in the settlement process 
introduced rigidities leading t o misallocation of resources. 
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(6) The widely held belief of spontaneous colonization in virgin 
areas as t he most precarious and miserable form of subsistence agriculture, 
wasteful of soil and forest resources only proved to be partia lly valid 
for the more isolated colonies . 
(7) The cost and reliability of transportation proved to be the 
key variable in the degree of successful and permanent settlement. 
(8) The limitations imposed by inability to find markets for certain 
agricult ural crops were severe. 
(9) The production gains obtained from putting idle land and labor 
to \YOrk in the mo r e isolated areas 'vere only considered temporary, unl ess 
the colonists could be assisted to move forward technologically from the 
primitive "slash and burn 11 cycle of land utilization. 
(10) If assistance for modernization of production was not made 
available , then the government would be faced with accelerated forest 
destruction and proliferation of marginal units. 
Recommendations 
(l) The process of moving people to the resource rich l01-1lands, 
that started as an expensive and not very successful government initia-
tive and has become a selfsustaining spontaneous movement, should be 
treated as a valuable and dynamic force in Bolivia's development. 
(2) Explicit government support should be given to spontaneous 
colonization as a dynamic force that can open up frontier areas at low 
cost by tapping the energy and initiative of the colonists and the enor -
mous conmtuni ty interest in roads, schools, etc . 
(3) Once permanent settlements have been established and land put 
into production, government should concentrate on supporting the 
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colonists with adaptive research, credit, marketing development and pro-
motion of agro-industries. This support \vill allow the modernization of 
production techniques, the transformation of the present exploitive 
agricultural methods and achieve the necessary increase in the productivity 
of labor. 
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Table 27. Sugar Cane--Per Hectare Costs. Sale at Farm Gate, Chane-Piray 
Area, Bolivia, 1971-72 
Practice 
Fixed Costs 
Land preparation 
Seed: 6 tons at $b.94 
Planting : by hand 20 men 
Replanting: 7 men 
Total fixed cost (Amortized for 5 years 
at 15%) 
Variable Costs 
Cleaning : men (3 times) at $b . 70 
Harvesting: $bl5/ton for 50 tons/hectare 
yield 
Total variable costs 
Interest on operating capital (l/2 total 
costs for 6 months at 15%) 
Total annual cost 
Plantation 
Each 5 Years 
$b/Hectare 
$b 450 
564 
300 
100 
$bl,414 
Annual 
$b/Hectare 
$b 134 
168 
90 
__ 3_0 
$b 422 
$b 210 
$b 960 
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Table 28. Bananas--Per Hectare Costs. Sale at Farm Gate, Chane-Piray 
Area, Bolivia, 1971-72 
Practice 
Fixed Costs 
Land preparation: burning of rice 
stubble 
Banana transplants and transport 
Planting: 20 men 
Total fixed cost (Amortized for 5 years 
at 15%) 
Variable Costs 
Cleaning: 5 men (2 times) at $b60 
Harvesting: 1 0 men 
Total variable costs 
Interest on operating capital (1/2 total 
variable costs for 6 months at 15%) 
Total annual cost 
Plantation 
Each 5 Years 
$b/Hec tare 
$bl00 
500 
$b900 
Annual 
$b/Hectare 
$b 30 
150 
$b270 
$bl20 
_gQ_ 
$b2Li0 
Table 29. Dryland Rice--Per Hecta re Costs. Sale at Farm Gate , Chane-
Piray Area, Bolivia , 1971-72 
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Variable Costs $b/Hectare 
Land preparation: cutting dmvn forest and burning 
Seed: 15 kilos a t $b2 
Seeding : 2 men 
Weeding: 6 men (2 times) at $b.72 
Harvesting: contract 10 fanegas at $b2.40 per fanegaa 
Food for harvesters 
Transportation : field to farm 
Hull rice : at $b4 per fanega 
Total variable costs 
Interest costs on operating capital (1/2 total 
variable cost for 6 months at 15%) 
Total annual costs 
3 1 Fanega equals 384 pounds of rough rice . 
$b 450 
30 
24 
144 
240 
100 
10 
$bl , 038 
!!~_.1.'!. 
$bl , 077 
Table 30. 
Sector 
Chane 
Aguais 
Sagrado 
Corazon 
Total 
aTable 2 . 
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Sugar Cane Revenues , Production Costs and Returns to Land and 
flanagement, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971- 72 
Net on Net on Total Area in Total 
Farm Farm Annual Profit to Sugar Return to 
p~:1~~na ~:~~=r~fir ~~~~=r~Gr Ma~:;~m:~~c He~~:;es ~~~::e::~t 
55 2,7 50 1 ,418 1 , 332 1, 090 1 , 451, 880 
45 2 , 250 1 , 418 832 833 693 , 056 
Jl 1 , 550 1,418 132 
---------
2 , 144 , 936 
byield of 50 tons per hectare . 
cTable 2 7 . 
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Table 31. Rice Revenues, Prod uction Costs and Returns to Land and Hanage-
ment, Chane-Piray Area, Bolivia , 1971-72 
Net on 
Farm On Farm Total 
Value Value Total Profit to Return to 
Per Fa3 Per ~ac Annual Land and Area in Land and 
Secto r $bb $b Per Had Hanagemente Rice Ha Hanagement 
Chane 141 1,410 1,077 333 265 88,245 
Aguais 141 1,410 1,077 333 1,267 421' 911 
Sagrado 
Corazon 140 1,400 1,077 323 1,485 479,655 
San Pedro 138 1,388 l ,077 311 94 7 294,517 
Calama 136 1,360 1,077 283 1,367 386,861 
El Carmen 132 1,320 1,077 243 177 43 011 
Total 1 '714 '200 
3 Fa means 
bTable 3. 
fanega. 
cHa means hectare . 
dYield of 10 fanegas per hectare. 
eTable 29. 
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Table 32 . Banana Revenues, Production Costs and Return to Land and 
Hanagement , Chane- Piray Area, Bolivia, 1971-72 
Sector 
Chane 
Aguais 
Sagrado 
Corazon 
San Pedro 
Calama 
Net on 
Farm 
Value per 
Hectare 
882 
882 
Total 
Annual 
Cost per 
Hec tareC 
519 
519 
519 
519 
519 
Profit to 
Land and 
Hanagement 
363 
363 
230 
142 
142 
Area in 
Bananas 
Hectare 
472 
1,131 
237 
54 
55 
Total 
Return to 
Land and 
Hanagement 
171 , 336 
410,553 
54,510 
7,668 
Total 651,877 
aValued at $b.85 per 60 pound bunch due to increased spoilage from lack 
of transport to collect mature fruit. 
bva l ued at $b.75 per 60 pound bunch due to increased spoilage from lack 
of transport to collect mature fruit. 
CTable 28. 
